Aviation Regulation – History and Practice – Part 4

Aviation Regulation – History and Practice

Part Four

This part covers the Post-War and the Regulated and Protectionist Era and the Role of Government in International Civil Aviation with a focus on the Cold War Era.

POST-WAR AND THE REGULATED AND PROTECTIONIST ERA 

United States Commercial Aviation

Often referred to as the “glory days of airline travel”, the Post-War and the Regulated and Protectionist Era witnessed the manufacture of large capacity, long-haul, piston driven aircraft, the introduction of and transition to commercial jet airliners that ushered in the “Jet Age”, and finally the development of high capacity, wide-bodied aircraft that started the path toward the end to economic regulation of the privately-owned U.S. airlines.

ConstellationIn the United States, the trunk carriers began the transition to peace-time operations, enjoying the technology developed during the war. There was a surplus of former military transport and bomber aircraft that were acquired by the trunk airlines and modified for commercial service. These surplus aircraft were also purchased by entrepreneurs who began to transport people and cargo on an ad hoc basis, with no fixed routes or schedules. Thus emerged a new type air carrier to be known as the non-scheduled or “non-skeds” to the public or as “large irregular carriers” to the CAB, which was powerless to regulate them under the current statutes. This was remedied by an amendment to the Civil Aeronautics Act that created supplemental air carriers and supplemental air transportation requiring these carriers to possess certificates of public convenience and necessity in order to operate as an air carrier.

In addition, the post-war years witnessed the granting of new “feeder” routes by the CAB. Although the trunk carriers claimed a right to these routes under their grandfather rights, the CAB nevertheless granted these new routes to another new class of air carrier known as “Local Service Carriers”, each with a regionally centered route system. Airlines such as Allegheny, Mohawk, Lake Central, Frontier, Bonanza, Ozark and Southern were all certificated during the 1945-1951 period. Because of the thin markets served by these carriers, they were awarded subsidies to keep operating in these markets.

These new air carriers, added to the already existing trunk carriers, meant an overcrowding of American airspace, and the regulation in place for air traffic control was soon considered antiquated.

In 1956, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed Edward Peck Curtis as Special Assistant for Aviation and was named to head a commission to study the dramatic increase in airline traffic and to propose ways to deal with airplane traffic jams at airports. This was followed by and event, however, that shook the very foundation of air traffic control.

800px-1956_Grand_Canyon_mid-air_collisionOn the morning of 30 June 1956, United Airlines flight 718 collided with TWA flight 2 over the Grand Canyon. With 128 fatalities this was at the time the largest loss of life in an aviation accident. This high profile accident, which took place in uncontrolled airspace, raised public concern for airline safety.

As a result, in 1957, Congress passed the Airways Modernization Act that established the Airways Modernization Board (AMB) headed by General Elwood Quesada.  The mandate of the Board was the development and modernization of the national system of navigation and air traffic control facilities to serve the present and future needs of civil and military aviation.

Two subsequent mid-air collisions between military aircraft and commercial airliners, one near Las Vegas, Nevada (United Airlines flight 736) on April 21, 1958, where 49 died, and another involving Capital Airlines over Brunswick, Maryland a month later on May 20 that cost 11 lives, showed further imperfections in the regulation of air traffic, particularly the need for unified control of airspace for civil and military flights.

The day after the Brunswick collision, Senator Mike Monroney and Representative Oren Harris introduced the Federal Aviation Act and two days after Brunswick, a stopgap presidential proclamation was issued that (1) required military jet aircraft to fly by Instrument Flight Rules while in the civil airways below 25,000 ft. (later reduced to 20,000 ft.) and (2) prohibited jet penetration swoops from high to low altitudes through civil airways.

Citing “recent midair collisions of aircraft occasioning tragic losses of human life,” President Dwight D. Eisenhower announced the White House’s support of the legislation on 13 June 1958. The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 passed Congress and was signed into law by Eisenhower on 23 August.

Taking a comprehensive approach to the federal role in fostering and regulating civilNewsign aeronautics and air commerce, the new law repealed the Air Commerce Act of 1926, the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, the Airways Modernization Act of 1957, and those portions of various presidential plans dealing with civil aviation. The legislation assigned the functions exercised under these repealed laws to two independent agencies — a new Federal Aviation Agency (FAA) and a Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB).

Provisions of the Act included:

Established the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA, later Federal Aviation Administration).

Abolished the CAA, and empowered the FAA to oversee and regulate safety in the airline industry and the use of American airspace by both military and civilian aircraft.

CAB continued as an independent agency and retained jurisdiction over route allocation, accident investigation and fare applications.

International routes subject to bilateral agreements between the US and the country involved and the CAB designated the carrier to operate the route.

DOT-FAA_Headquarters_by_Matthew_BisanzThe twenty years following the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was characterized as an era of strict economic regulation in the United States and government protectionism in the rest of the world. The privately owned U.S. flagged airlines were restricted by the CAB as to where they could operate and what fares they could charge. Routes were awarded after long and costly proceedings where a carrier needed to prove the market applied for11.Wash-CAB actually needed the service. Fares were also subject to board approval and were calculated using a formula known as the Standard Industry Fare Level (SIFL). A small handful U.S. carriers operated international routes, most notably Pan American, TWA and Northwest, with Pan American being the dominant carrier and considered the “Chosen Instrument” for the United States.

Below are the regulated-era route systems and typical aircraft of the U.S. carriers American, Pan American, TWA and United:

AA 1976

MAP 1966 Sep

TWA 1978

UAL 74

DC-7B-N339AA-SAN-122562-860x539proctor

707-123B-N7522A-SAN-1263-860x486proctor

Electra - Proctor

DC-9 Mark Hansen

707 inaugural flight Orly

377-3 RA Scholefield

1049G-N7108C-LAX-564-860x461 proctor

707-131-N743TW-LAX-41863-870x504 proctor

DC-8 at LAX

DC-7-N6331C-SAN-dupe-860x503 proctor

On 15 October 1966, the United States Department of Transportation (USDOT or DOT) was established as the federal Cabinet department of the U.S. government concerned with transportation. It began operation on April 1, 1967 and is headed by the United States Secretary of Transportation.

Prior to its establishment, the Under Secretary of Commerce for Transportation administered the functions now associated with it. In 1965, Najeeb Halaby, then Administrator of the FAA, suggested to President Lyndon B. Johnson that transportation be elevated to a cabinet-level post, and that the FAA be folded into the DOT.

DOT’s mission is to “Serve the United States by ensuring a fast, safe, efficient, accessible, and convenient transportation system that meets our vital national interests and enhances the quality of life of the American people, today and into the future.”

Usdot_headquarters

Provisions related to air transportation include:

The FAA became an agency within the department.

The CAB remained an independent regulatory agency with jurisdiction over economic matters (routes and rates/tariffs).

Established the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) that took over the CAB’s accident investigatory function. NTSB was severed from DOT by the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974.

International Commercial Aviation

In the international arena, the foreign flagged airlines in the Post War era were largelyAir France state-owned and were controlled by their respective civil aviation authorities. International routes were governed by bilateral agreements between the countries involved and fares were agreed to at Traffic Conferences organized by IATA. The airline of the Soviet Union, Aeroflot, and airlines of Eastern European countries were also state-owned.

Tu114 Pereslautsev Alex

Foreign-flag carriers operating international routes were generally identified as being the “Chosen Instrument” of their owning countries.

377_boac

DC-7C-JA6302-LAX-3460-860x554 proctor

Government Role in International Civil Aviation

One very important factor during this era was the government role in international civil aviation, best illustrated by how governments dealt with aviation issues in three main areas: ICAO, IATA and bilateral Air Services Agreements (ASA). This era was dominated by the Cold War, and the international airline industry was in many respects, though not obviously, a pawn in the struggle between the super powers at the time.

Political considerations became apparent early, when, in 1947, ICAO became an agency ofIberia the United Nations.  In one case, as a condition of acceptance of ICAO into the UN, the Soviet Union demanded the expulsion of Spain from ICAO.  Spain was then considered a key terminal and a source or destination for a substantial amount of traffic, and its expulsion hampered the development of air facilities and aids to navigation that were essential to orderly air transport. In another case involving South Africa, thirty-one African nations demanded the expulsion of that country because of its apartheid policy. The attempt failed because of failure to meet the required advance notice.

Government involvement in IATA activities, although a non-governmental organization, was also prevalent. Under its Articles of Association, traffic or rate conferences were called whenever necessary. Each member had one vote, and each member had veto rights. These conferences made a variety of decisions, but only those that were unanimously agreed on and expressed in the form of a resolution were binding. However, because most international airlines at the time were state-owned, these resolutions would not be binding on the international airline until its government approved. Further, a member would not be bound if it certified the resolution was not coincident with the laws or official policy of its government. Despite these restrictions, however, government approval of IATA resolutions during this period was overwhelming. This can be attributed to the fact that most international airlines received instructions prior to attending the conferences and in some cases, airline representatives were actually state or government employees disguised as officials of the state-owned airline.

The government role in the industry, however, was most intense and interesting at the bilateral level. This was particularly true during the Cold War and the role of government was interpreted in terms of foreign policy. The international airline could either be an instrument of foreign policy or it could reflect or parallel the foreign policy of a country. A country may also use its international airline to gain political favors from other countries. Here, the key to successful negotiations was bargaining power, or the ability to influence other countries in a way that would contribute to the economic success of the home country’s airline. It was also entirely possible that an airline’s profitability could be damaged because something of value to a national airline could be traded away by government to meet a governmental objective.

For the most part the countries of the international airlines exchanged routes on a reciprocal basis and when both had equal bargaining power. A country with greater power, however, can demand more for its routes. In a 1957 case, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines appliedDC-7C-PH-DSC-KLM-IDL-661-Bob-Proctor-860x499 for additional routes in the United States. The U.S. government was not prepared to grant these additional routes because the Netherlands had nothing to offer in return. To the Dutch, KLM was one of the Netherlands’ biggest industries that was a symbol of Dutch internationalism and initiative. Thus, to obtain the desired routes, the Dutch offered a continuing cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). This was acceptable to the US and the routes were granted. The granting of airline rights to foreign governments in exchange for political support, military bases or troop contributions to NATO were regular bargaining tools of the U.S. in order to maintain its military superiority over the Soviet Union.

ASAs can also be subject to disputes between the parties and at times an injured party might resort to counter-measures to protect its interests. This was illustrated in a case between Pan American and Air France in connection with the bilateral ASA between the U.S. and France. Under that agreement Pan American was authorized a scheduled service between Paris and London. However, because of the aggressive subsidies being provided 747-121-N740PA-LAX-102184-860x509proctorby the French government to Air France, Pan American decided to substitute a smaller, more economical  aircraft for the 747 already scheduled on that route (gauge change). The French government refused on the basis ranging from assertions of national honor (Pan American flying anything smaller than a 747 into Paris would be an affront) to the more pragmatic reason that Air France would enjoy the prospect of forcing its competitor to run a grossly unprofitable route (with the 747). Finally, the French compelled Pan American to cease its flights to Paris. The U.S. government proposed arbitration to resolve the dispute, but for two years the French refused. The U.S. eventually made a reprisal by suspending Air France’s Paris-Los Angeles route, long established under the ASA.

This got the French government’s attention and France agreed to arbitration. The issues were (1) whether Pan American could change gauge and (2) whether the U.S. could unilaterally suspend Air France’s route to Los Angeles. The first issue was resolved in favor of Pan American. In the case of the second issue, the French argued that as the ASA provided for arbitration, it was impermissible for the U.S. to engage in unilateral self-help measures. The arbitrator ruled, however, that it was France that had been setting up707-328-AF-LAX-760-Bob-Proctor-860x474 barriers by not agreeing to arbitration and that it was only the U.S.’s retaliatory move terminating the Los Angeles route that brought France to the table. In short, the arbitrator ruled that counter-measures were a necessary part of the punch and counter-punch often needed to get parties to submit their disputes to arbitration or other method of binding settlement.

One point made in this case was that in any use of counter-measures, there could always be a risk of escalation. France could have cut off Pan American’s New York-Paris route and then the U.S. could have retaliated by economic or other sanctions outside the air transport sector, and so on. The point here is that although the underlying reasons for the dispute were aviation related, there could have been other non-aviation factors driving the actions of the French government.

Beyond the government role in ASAs, and as alluded to above, an international airline during this era could be a reflection of or parallel the foreign policy of its country. A good example of this is Aeroflot, then the only international airline of the Soviet Union. As previously mentioned the Soviet Union did not attend the Chicago Convention. The Soviet policy at the time was that of isolationism and civil aviation was kept at a low priority. This changed in the 1950s when the Soviet government switched to a more internationalist policy in relation to the Eastern Bloc countries, and it was reflected in Aeroflot’s opening of new routes to capitals in Eastern Europe. The 1960s also witnessed some dramatic changes after the switch from the Khrushchev regime to the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime. Here the policy changed to greater flexibility toward the Western powers, and Aeroflot began operating to countries outside the Soviet bloc and by 1967 almost all Western European capitals. In 1968, after several years of negotiations, service was inaugurated between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. The agreement best illustrates the concepts of political considerations in bilateral negotiations and the notion of the “Chosen Instrument”. The airlines involved were Pan American and Aeroflot.

If there was any route in Pan American’s history that could be designated as a “Chosen Instrument” route, the U.S.-U.S.S.R. could be that route. Pan American was the selected airline because it was recognized as the primary U.S.-flag carrier as manifested by the So16A-Hambletonviet Union’s aviation officials making the initial contact directly with Juan Trippe. After reporting the contact to the U.S. State Department and the Civil Aeronautics Board, Trippe was authorized to negotiate with the Soviets on key issues for an ASA between the two countries. However, given the political climate, it can be reasonably inferred that political considerations also played a role in formulation of the final agreement between the two countries and both Pan American and Aeroflot were instruments of those considerations, and therefore instruments of both countries’ foreign policy, hence,  “Chosen Instruments”.

For Pan American, a private enterprise as opposed to the state-owned Aeroflot, the operation was a money loser and the competition was not on a level playing field. Quite simply, Pan American could not sell tickets in the Soviet Union and was at a tremendous economic disadvantage. Unfortunately, there was no provision for a subsidy to a U.S. flag carrier operating at an economic disadvantage in an international market at the government’s bidding. Pan American eventually suspended the losing operation but did so when U.S.-Soviet relations were souring. It was not until relations began to improve between the two countries in the mid to late 1980s did the service resume, in 1986, later crowned with a non-stop 747 service in 1988.

59-IL-62-cropped

From the late 1960s through the early 1970s, Aeroflot grew rapidly and by 1973, had set a record for route expansion, operating under sixty-five bilateral agreements with other countries. These changes from isolation to a world-wide presence could be considered a reflection of the Soviet Union’s foreign policy at the time, or it could have been viewed as a challenge to the U.S. superiority in air transport. Whatever the case, the Soviet policy of détente was based on political and economic weakness. There were three basic reasons for this: (1) the Sino-Soviet Conflict, in which China had survived the Cultural Revolution and gained strength in the international arena; (2) the avoidance of Western European unity, which could be a strategic threat and a threat in itself to Eastern Europe and the Soviet control of Eastern Europe; and (3) the weakened Soviet economy, which had found the Soviets lagging behind the U.S., especially in consumer goods. The policy was designed to effect technological cooperation with the West, avoid a political struggle on two fronts (China at one end, the West at the other) and increase political influence in Europe. In 1973, Aeroflot concluded a Trans-Siberian route exchange (connecting Europe and Japan through Moscow, thereby saving time and mileage) with Japan Airlines, British Airways, Lufthansa and Air France.

The Trans-Siberian route was considered important because it impacted the bargaining power of both the U.S., where travel between Japan and Europe was through Anchorage, Alaska, and the Middle East, which had bargaining power with Fifth Freedom rights. By IL62 JAP Aeroflot Malcolm Nasongranting this route to Japan Airlines and the European airlines, the Soviet Union effectively diminished the U.S. and Middle East bargaining power in this market. In addition, this Soviet move made possible increased influence in both Japan and Western Europe.

Whether the Soviet activities at the time were a threat to U.S. leadership is questionable. First, the Soviet aircraft were well behind those of the U.S. technologically and were more expensive to operate; secondly, the airline service offered was not consumer-oriented and was reputed to be deplorable; and third, Aeroflot was not a member of IATA at the time. However, the view at the time was that the rapid Soviet growth was a bid to engage in a contest for national prestige and political influence, by using aviation as a means to an end.

One other event during this era, which occurred on board the fishing boat Wild Goose in the Puget Sound, would set in motion a series of events that would rock the very foundation of the industry:

As legend has it, Pan American’s Juan Trippe asked, “Would you build it if I bought it?” to which Bill Allen of Boeing responded, “Would you buy it if I built it?”

What was “it”? The Boeing 747

END OF PART FOUR

The next installment of this story, Part 5, will cover Deregulation and Open Skies.

 

 

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Aviation Regulation – History and Practice – Part 2

Aviation Regulation – History and Practice

Part Two

FOREIGN AIR MAIL CONTRACTS

The airmail legislation described in Part One did not apply to air transportation of foreign mail. Eventually, with the U.S. government strongly supporting mail service between North and South America, the U.S. Congress passed the Foreign Air Mail Act of 1928 to regulate such international service. This, however, was preceded by the formation of Pan American Airways and its inauguration of international airline services between the U.S. and Cuba.

Pan American Airways, Inc. (PAA) was founded on 14 March 1927 by Air Force Majors “Hap” Arnold, Carl Spaatz and John H. Jouett, later joined by John K. Montgomery and Richard B. Bevier, as a counterbalance to German-owned carrier “SCADTA” (Colombo-German Aerial Transport Co) that had been operating in Colombia since 1920. SCADTA was viewed as a possible German aerial threat to the Panama Canal.  Eventually Montgomery petitioned the US government to call for bids on an U.S. airmail contract between Key West and Havana (FAM 4) and won the contract.  However, PAA lacked any aircraft to perform the job and did not have landing rights in Cuba.  Under the terms of the contract, PAA had to be flying by 19 October 1927.

juan-t-trippeOn 2 June 1927, Juan Trippe formed the Aviation Corporation of America (ACA) with financially powerful and politically well-connected backing, and raised $300,000.  On 1 July Reed Chambers and financier Richard Hoyt formed Southeastern Airlines.   On 8 July Trippe formed Southern Airlines and on 11 October Southeastern was reincorporated as Atlantic, Gulf and Caribbean Airways.  Trippe then proposed a merger between these three groups and in doing so played a trump card:  He and John A. Hambleton, one of his backers, traveled to Cuba and persuaded the Cuban president to grant landing rights to the Aviation Corporation, making Montgomery’s mail contract useless as a bargaining chip.  After much wrangling between the groups, including a meeting on Hoyt’s yacht during which Assistant Postmaster General Irving Grover threatened that if there was no deal he would not be awarding any contract to anyone, the Aviation Corporation of the Americas was formed, operating as Pan American Airways, headed by Juan Trippe.  Later the corporation’s name was changed to Pan American Airways.

The deadline of 19 October still loomed, however. A Fokker F-VII aircraft was selected for the operation, but could not be used becaFairchildFC-2 La Ninause Meacham’s Field in Key West was not completed and could not accommodate the aircraft. What transpired was an eleventh hour miracle. Pan American’s representative in Miami learned that a Fairchild FC-2 monoplane was in Key West, sitting out a hurricane threat.  The aircraft was owned by West Indian Aerial Express (the Fairchild Group) and a deal was made to charter the aircraft.  The pilot was offered $145.50 to carry mail to Havana that had just arrived on the Florida East Coast and Atlantic Coast Line railroads.  The hurricane threat disappeared and the trip was made.  The rest is history.

On 28 October 1927, the Fokker finally left Key West on Pan American’s inaugural international flight, carrying 772 lb. of mail.

FOKKER F7-staff

Under the Act, Foreign Airmail contracts (FAMs) were put up for bidding and Pan American was able to win them, making it the only US-flagged carrier with authority from the U.S. government to carry mail to foreign countries on international routes.  Operating authority to these countries, however, needed to be secured and at the time there was no framework within the US government to accomplish that. Pan American’s Juan Trippe was able to do it. He carried out then what the U.S. Departments of State and Transportation do today with respect to foreign routes.

Pan American established services first in the Caribbean, the whole of Latin America and eventually across the 1930s colorfulPacific Ocean. Authority across the Pacific, however, was not Trippe’s original transoceanic ambition. It was the Atlantic. However the geopolitical situation coupled with technological limitations made that option impossible. The path to Europe was through Newfoundland. Unfortunately, negotiations between Trippe, Britain, Canada and Newfoundland in 1932 did not provide the access desired, although some understanding was achieved between Pan American and Britain’s Imperial Airways with regard to traffic rights. Because Newfoundland appeared to be in doubt, Trippe looked south. Unfortunately, the political situation in Portugal made it difficult for Pan American to negotiate for traffic rights there as well.

What is interesting here, with respect to the negotiations over Newfoundland, is that it was not the American government doing Pan American’s bidding. It was Juan Trippe. And it was Trippe who personally dealt with the governments of Britain, Canada and Newfoundland, following a pattern used when he negotiated traffic rights to countries in Latin America.

Any hope for trans-Atlantic operations, however, was dashed when, in April 1934, the British government demanded reciprocity with the United States over traffic rights.  The British government spoke for Imperial and questioned why the U.S. government did not speak for Pan American, as both entities were instruments of national policy. Trippe had overestimated his diplomatic skills and his “go-it-alone diplomacy” was not working. He admitted that he did not see much future for Pan American in the North Atlantic. In addition the British, in 1934, had nothing like Pan American’s S-42, then the most advanced aircraft in the world. Until Imperial Airways had a similar aircraft that could cross the Atlantic to the United States, Pan American would find itself blocked from operating to Britain.

S-42The focus thus switched to the Pacific. After a “great circle” trans-Pacific route through the north was ruled out due to issues between the United States and the Soviet Union, it was decided to take the route that represented the longest distance between the United States and the Orient: the mid-Pacific.

Here, the issue of traffic rights was not a problem for Pan American. The route involved stops at Honolulu, Midway, Wake and Guam, terminating in Manila, all of which were under U.S. jurisdiction. At Guam and the Philippines, the U.S. Navy had established bases on the pretext of potential confrontation with Japan. Midway was being used by the Navy for war games staged in the area. Wake, a tiny island, discovered by Trippe in the New York Public Library, was an uninhabited coral atoll, and a minor trophy of the Spanish-American War. It was a critical point for the trans-Pacific flight. Trippe eventually got permission to use the island as a base.

On 24 October 1935 the U.S. Post Office awarded Trippe the trans-Pacific FAM and on 22 November, the China Clipper inaugurated service from the mainland United States across the Pacific.

China Clipper

 

U.S. REGULATION OF AIR TRANSPORTATION

The first instance of United States regulation of aircraft and airmen was in the Air Commerce Act of 1926. It defined “Air Commerce” as carriage by aircraft of persons or property for hire, and the navigation of aircraft in the furtherance of or for the benefit of a business. It established federal regulations regarding aircraft, airmen, navigational facilities and air traffic, including the development and maintenance of airways and aircraft altitude separation. The Act required that aircraft were to be inspected for airworthiness and were required to have markings on the outside for identification. It also provided the requirement that airmen be tested for aeronautical knowledge and have a physical examination completed to insure their physical fitness.

The Act also promoted civil aviation to attract capital and provide a legal basis necessary for its development. The Aeronautics Branch of the Department of Commerce was established by an amendment to the Act in 1929 and was responsible for overseeing and implementing the Act. The regulations promulgated would be known as Civil Air Regulations (CARs).

caa1938In 1935, the Federal Aviation Commission (FAC), a board created by Congress in 1934 to study airline regulation and recommend policy called for creation of a centralized and independent authority to regulate the airline industry. As a result Congress passed the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 that was signed into law by President Roosevelt. The Act established the Civil Aeronautics Authority (CAA) and transferred federal responsibilities for non-military aviation to that new independent agency. The Act also gave the CAA quasi-judicial and legislative functions related to economic and safety regulation. This included regulation of fares and routes the air carriers would serve. The CAA was also responsible for aviation regulations, airways, navigational facilities and air traffic control.

The Act created a three-member Air Safety Board that investigated accidents and made recommendations to eliminate the causes of accidents and also provided for an Administrator, who performed executive functions related to the development, operation and administration of air navigations, as well as the promotion of aviation. Airmail contracts were replaced by “Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity”.

CAAwing

In 1940, President Roosevelt split the CAA into two agencies, the Civil Aeronautics Administration, which went back to the Department of Commerce, and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB). The offshoot of the original CAA retained responsibility for ATC, airmen and aircraft certification, safety enforcement, and airway development. CAB Welch Pogue NASM Archivesresponsibilities included safety rulemaking, accident investigation and economic regulation of the airlines. The latter included passenger fares, air mail rates, route entry and exit, mergers and acquisitions and inter-carrier agreements. The routes of the then existing airlines were “grandfathered” and these airlines became later known as “trunks”, a term borrowed from the trunk railroads of the day. These trunk airlines were certified to operate on medium and long-haul interstate routes under Section 401 of the enabling legislation and were sometimes referred to as “401 carriers”.  In 1942, L. Welch Pogue, Esq., was appointed Chairman of the CAB and served until 1946.

UAL_Route_Map_1940

1941-april-27-american-airlines-timetables-route-maps-and-history_4712

TWA 1935

American_DC-3     Boeing 247-1

 

EARLY EUROPEAN AVIATION

Initial Operations

In the United Kingdom, Aircraft Transport and Travel, a fixed-wing airline, operated the first international route in the world between Hounslow Heath outside London and Le Bourget near Paris. The airline also won the first British DH16-AT&Tcivil airmail contract between Hawkinge and Cologne. Handley Page, another airline, operated a London-Paris passenger service.

In France, Société Générale des Transports Aériens operated flights between Toussus, le Noble and Kenley (near Croydon, outside London), and Compagnie des Messageries Aériennes operated airmail and freight service between Le Bourget and Lille.

In Germany, Deutsche Luft Hansa was created in 1926 and became a major investor in airlines outside Europe, particularly in South America. The German manufactured Junkers, Dornier and Fokker aircraft were at the time the most advanced in the world.

In the Netherlands, KLM, the oldest continuously operating airline in the world made its first flight in 1920 between Croydon Airport, London and Amsterdam.KLM-poster-1919

In Finland, Aero O/Y (now Finnair) started operations in 1924 between Helsinki and Tallinn, Estonia.

And in the Soviet Union, the Chief Administration of Civil Air Fleet was established in 1921. Later, a German-Russian joint venture was established to provide flights to the west from Russia. Domestic operations were begun in 1923 by Dobrolyot and from 1932, all operations were carried under the name “Aeroflot”.

Farman-goliath France

European Airlines Recognized as Airmail Carriers

The period of 1920-1927 was a period of significant development for air transportation but the postalHandley_Page_0_100_aircraft administrations and airlines were in the dark as to future possibilities for international airmail. By 1924, the idea of using aircraft for the transportation of mail began to gain momentum, and in September, 1927, at a conference called at the suggestion of the Air Transport Committee of the International Chamber of Commerce held at The Hague, an agreement was reached that established airlines as officially recognized carriers of the mail. The Conference also initiated rules and regulations concerning the acceptance and rapid delivery of airmail, a rate-making structure, the expeditious handling of airmail by countries without air services, and the basis of accounting procedures for international airmail. Another provision agreed was that the PAR AVION labels should have a blue color and, when the mail did not actually travel by air, such labels or annotations should be crossed out.

EUROPEAN CONSOLIDATION AND EXPANSION

Consolidation 

In the United Kingdom, there was a movement toward consolidation to compete with the subsidized French and German airlines. In 1924, Imperial Airlines was formed through a merger of four airlines, and was able to compete with these French and German carriers. In addition the airline began survey flights to far-flung parts of the British Empire. The airline also ordered the Handley Page W8f City of Washington.

Tanken van een vliegtuig met twee propellers. Schiphol, Nederland, 1927.

In France, Air Union was formed in January 1923 and later merged with four other airlines to become Air France in 1933.

Expansion

After consolidation survey flights, Imperial Airlines extended its operations during the late 1920s and 1930s to the furthest reaches of the British Empire. Destinations included South Africa, Australia, British India, Rangoon, Singapore, Basra, Karachi, Hong Kong, etc. The aircraft, however, were small, with a capacity of fewer than 20 passengers, and the passengers consisted of the wealthy or British men doing colonial administration, business or research.

Air France’s operations depended on links to points in North Africa and Indochina.

KLM in the Netherlands also depended on links to its far flung colonies, including the East Indies.

Hindenburg_at_lakehurstGermany, however, lacked colonies but began expanding services with the airship Graf Zeppelin in regular scheduled passenger service between Germany and North and South America. Airship Hindenburg entered passenger service and successfully crossed the Atlantic 36 times before crashing at Lake Hurst, New Jersey, in May 1937.

One point of interest here is that during this time the state-owned flag carriers of several European nations were establishing “foreign routes” to their own colonies in Asia, Africa and the Indian Sub-Continent, all without the need to obtain traffic rights. Privately owned Pan American did not have this luxury and was required to obtain traffic rights to operate not only to the European countries, but to their colonies as well.

The maps below illustrate the typical route systems of two key international airlines prior to and during World War II. The U.S. carrier, Pan American, obtained its authority through negotiating for landing rights at overseas destinations. The foreign carrier, Imperial of Great Britain offered overseas destinations through its colonies. As previously noted, Pan American’s initial transpacific authority came about by virtue of U.S. control of waypoints between San Francisco and Manila. The authority to Hong Kong came about after Pan American’s Juan Trippe used his previously obtained landing rights in Portuguese Macao to pressure the British to grant him landing rights in Hong Kong. At the time, the China National Aviation Corporation (C.N.A.C.) was yet another subsidiary of Pan American. Note the extent of operations in Latin America. 

PAA Map 1940    PAA South America

Imperial_routes_April_1935

SITUATION AT THE EVE OF WORLD WAR II

 Late 1930s

By the late 1930s, Pan American had launched trans-Atlantic flights with the Boeing 314 flying boat. The British and French were operating trans-Atlantic flights as well, but only under mail contracts. Pan American was the only airline with the capacity to accommodate passenger traffic.

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Imperial flying boat-cropped

 

 

 

 

 

At the same time, U.S. domestic airlines (and Pan American) were looking at high-capacity-long range landplanes (DC-4 and Lockheed Constellation).

War Looms

War was looming in Europe and at the same time, Pan American began experiencing problems with its Boeing 314 operation due to bad weather in the winter months. Both these factors prompted a shift to a southern route that nearly doubled the flight time between the European continent and New York. The route departed Lisbon and stopped in Bolama (West Africa), Port of Spain and Bermuda before arriving in New York.

On the eve of World War II, Juan Trippe recognized that a shift from flying boats to landplanes on trans-Atlantic routes was inevitable. He was initially interested in acquiring the pressurized Lockheed Constellation and was “given permission” by Howard Hughes to acquire it. However, the war started and both DC-4 and Constellation production was shifted to the war effort.

C-69Navy-C54

For all intents and purposes, the world’s airlines shifted their operations to wartime, including Pan American and the U.S. domestic airlines. Other than the U.S. regulations that governed the U.S. carriers, international commercial aviation was governed by the provisions of the Paris Convention of 1919 and the Havana Convention of 1928. It would soon become obvious that both were obsolete.

END OF PART TWO

The next installment of this story, Part 3, will cover World War II, the Chicago Convention of 1944, ICAO, Air Services Agreements, the Freedoms of the Air, the concept of the “Chosen Instrument”, IATA and the Bermuda Agreement of 1946.

Aviation Law Conference – 29 September 2015 – Washington, DC

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Aviation Law Conference

September 29, 2015

On Tuesday, September 29, 2015, an important and timely conference will be held at the American University Washington College of Law covering the most recent developments in Aviation Law.

Topics to be included are FAA enforcement issues, aircraft safety and accident investigation, the evolving regulatory framework and privacy issues related to unmanned aircraft systems, developments in sanctions in the airline industry and a two-hour panel covering some of the “hot” topics of the day, including the Gulf Carrier Dispute, subsidies, labor issues and “flags of convenience”.

The conference will be divided into panels and debate is encouraged. Leading aviation attorneys have committed to participating in this conference, including Mark Atwood, Esq., of Cozen O’Connor, Russell Bailey, Esq., of the Airline Pilots Association (ALPA), Steve Dedmon, Esq., of Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University (ERAU), Cynthia Dominik, Esq., of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Mike Dworkin, Esq., of Michael Dworkin & Associates, Daniel Friedenzohn, Esq., of ERAU, Deanm Griffith, Esq., of the FAA, David Heffernan, Esq., of Cozen O’Connor, Darryl Jenkins, Aviation Consultant, Jim Johnson, Esq., of ALPA, Allan Mendelsohn, Esq., of the Law Offices of Allan Mendelsohn, Charles Raley, Esq., of the FAA, Sandy Sinick, Esq., of Cozen O’Connor, David Tochen, Esq., of the National Transportation Safety Board, Mark Tomicich, Esq., of the FAA and Thomas Whalen, Esq., of Schott Johnson LLP.

This conference is intended for airline and aviation professionals and management, attorneys, airline and aviation consultants, law students and students of the airline and aviation industry. The topics are timely and receiving much attention in the industry.

This conference is accredited for CLE credits by the State of Pennsylvania.

For an agenda and to register, Click Here.

Photos from previous Aviation Law Conference at American University Washington College of Law

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  Mendelsohn-3 small   Bailey-1 small  Del-3 small

  Atwood-1 crop

Group-1 small   Whalen-3 small   Group-3 small

  JPB-Popper-4 small

JPB-Jenkins-2 small  Friedenzohn-1 small  Group-2 small

  Klang-2 small

Aviation Law Conference: Legal Aspects of Aircraft Mishaps and Disasters

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AVIATION LAW CONFERENCE

Legal Aspects of Aircraft Mishaps and Disasters

asiana 214-1     af447-flight-recorder

November 10, 2014

9:00 am – 6:00 pm

American University Washington College of Law, Room 603

4801 Massachusetts Avenue, NW, Washington, DC 20016

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Purpose:  This conference will address the legal and organizational aspects of dealing with aircraft mishaps and disasters–not only finding causation, but how organizations should prepare for and respond to them.

 Who Should Attend:  Air carriers; air agencies; manufacturers; aircraft owners and operators; airport proprietors; aircraft and airline liability insurers; aircraft insurers; attorneys representing aviation concerns; plaintiffs’ attorneys.

 AGENDA

0830-0900      Registration/Coffee and Pastries

0900-0920      Welcome and Introductions

                          Professor Andrew F. Popper, Washington College of Law

                          Jamie Baldwin, WCL ‘81

0920-1015      Aviation Regulations and Federal Aircraft Accident Investigations: History and Practice

                         Jamie Baldwin, WCL ‘81

1015-1115        Nuts and Bolts of Aircraft Accident Investigation

                        Matt Robinson, Robson Forensics

1115-1130        Morning Networking Coffee Break

1130-1230       NTSB Responsibilities and Recent Proposed Rulemaking  Re: Accident Investigation

                        David Tochen,  Esq., General Counsel, National Transportation Safety Board

1300-1400      Luncheon

                         Keynote Speaker: John Marshall, former Captain, Boeing 747, Pan American World Airways

1400-1500      Family Assistance Legislation and its Role in the Swissair/Halifax Accident and

                        Lessons Learned from the TWA 800 and Korean Airlines/Guam Accidents

                        Tom Whalen,  Esq., Schott Johnson, LLP

1500-1600      Providing Legal Representation to the Operator after an Aircraft Mishap

                        Michael Dworkin, Esq., Michael L. Dworkin and Associates

1600-1630      Afternoon Networking Tea

1630-1730      Nuts and Bolts of Preparing Emergency Response Plan

                        John T. Van Geffen, Esq., Michael L. Dworkin and Associates

1730-1800      Wrap-Up and Questions and Answers

1800                End of Conference

 

There are no fees for this event.*

To Register for this Event Click Here.

For further information, please contact:  Office of Special Events & Continuing Legal Education,

American University Washington College of Law
Phone: 202.274.4075; Fax: 202.274.4079; or
secle@wcl.american.edu

CLE Accreditation will be applied for – 5 credits.  CLE registration – $275