Aviation Regulation – History and Practice – Part 3

 Aviation Regulation – History and Practice

Part Three

This part covers the end of World War II and the events leading up to the Chicago Convention of 1944, the Convention itself, the establishment of ICAO, the Freedoms of the Air and bilateral Air Service Agreements, the formation of IATA, the Bermuda Agreement of 1946 and the concept of the “Chosen Instrument”.

WORLD WAR II AND THE ROAD TO CHICAGO 

Like World War I, aviation technology made tremendous gains during World War II and these gains were enjoyed primarily by the United States, particularly in the area of high-capacity and long range air transport. Why this happened was a result of an agreement between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and British Prime Minister Winston Churchill: the U.S. would focus on the manufacture of high capacity and long range transport aircraft and bombers and the Allies would focus on the manufacture of fighters and light bombers. As the war began to wind down, the potential of United States superiority in the manufacture of transport aircraft became inevitable.

By 1944 defeat of Germany was all but certain. And by then, aviation technology had developed to the point that no city in the world was more than forty hours away from any other city by air. However, the round-the-world routes operated by military air transport would snap apart with the advent of peace and would be closed to commercial planes unless the broadest traffic rights were obtained before the end of the war. Airlines would be limited to flying within their own borders (and to/from colonies) and in the case of the United States, under Pan American’s pre-war trans-oceanic authority unless the U.S. engaged in nation-by-nation politicking as Juan Trippe had done in South America. In addition, U.S. airlines desiring to fly beyond the coasts of Western Europe would require permission from the host governments of the gateway countries. The flag airlines of the Western European countries did not have such a problem. They simply operated routes through their colonies to Asia and Africa. The British carrier, BOAC, was already operating to areas within the commonwealth where war had receded.

Boeing 377 assembly lineFor the United States, a policy needed to be developed as to post-war international aviation and it came in the form of government-to-government negotiations for landing rights. This, in effect, ended Juan Trippe’s term as a “shadow” foreign minister for U.S. aviation. As put forth by President Roosevelt, “Juan Trippe can’t have it all”, and indeed, as a reward for their support during the war effort, domestic airlines such as TWA, American Overseas Airlines (formerly American Export Airlines until American Airlines’ merger with owner American Export Lines) and Northwest were granted authority to operate international routes by the CAB.

However, what was clear as the end of the war approached, was that the United States would have undisputed superiority in air transport to the extent that it was the only country with the capability to operate a worldwide air transportation system. Two other factors contributed: The U.S. had long production lines capable of turning out four engine, long range aircraft and the U.S. was also capable of making immediate commercial business, whereas the Allies, specifically Great Britain, were still geared to military production and unable to make a swift change and, along with France, were technologically injured. In addition, the defeated Axis powers were denied the capability to manufacture and produce aircraft. The result was obvious: The U.S. had a virtual monopoly on the manufacture of transport aircraft.

This virtual monopoly, of course, did not sit well with the major powers, in particular Great Britain, and it becamC-54 assembly line at Douglas factory now ORD 1943e clear that an international conference was necessary to resolve the issues of international aviation and more importantly, the issues between the U.S. and Great Britain.

As it was also clear that both the Paris and Havana Conventions were now obsolete, there emerged a need for an international organization to maintain standards of safety, communications, signals and weather reporting and also prevent destructive competition breaking out of tariffs. As a result, with the urging of Great Britain, the United States took the initiative and sent out invitations to the Allied Nations and the neutral countries of Europe and Asia to meet in Chicago on 1 November 1944. Fifty-four countries accepted and sent delegations to the Conference on International Civil Aviation, to be known as the Chicago Convention of 1944.

CHICAGO AND BEYOND

Chicago 1944

 The Chicago Convention of 1944

 On 1 November 1944, delegates from fifty-four countries met at the Stevens Hotel in Chicago to commence what was to become the most significant conference on aviation regulation in history. The goal was to promote international traffic and develop an entry procedure that would allow healthy growth in the industry. In addition, issues such as routes, frequencies, pricing and fares, aircraft registration, navigational aids and safety standards were to be discussed.

StevensHotelChicago

At a Convention such as this, those with the greatest bargaining power could afford to make broad and sweeping proposals, usually tailored to their interests. The United States had this bargaining power and the feeling was it was going to be used to secure a near monopoly in long-haul air transport. What the U.S. was advocating was access to international routes, minimal control of rates, frequencies and capacity and an international organization with limited political and economic authority. In essence, an “open skies” regime was being promoted.

While freedom of competition is a noble position to take, it seemed absurd that such a position would be espoused by a competitor who has a commanding lead in an industry that was characterized by considerable restriction to entry. The U.S. position was similar to the proverbial elephant who, while dancing through the chicken yard, cried, “Everyone for Himself!”

Other countries advanced proposals calling for more control, while the British were calling for an international air authority that would control frequencies, capacities, rates and routes agreed upon bilaterally or multilaterally between nations. The authority would take action with a view to maintaining a broad equilibrium between the world’s air transport capacity and the traffic offering. It would thus eliminate wasteful practices, unfair competition and control subsidies.

The British, while lacking bargaining power in the air transport aspect, did wield considerable power from the political aspect. Through its vast number of overseas colonies and commonwealth connections, Britain had the capability of denying landing rights to, for instance, U.S. carriers. This was a major weakness for the United States: the need to obtain landing rights in foreign countries to load and unload passengers and cargo.

Delegates from other countries also submitted proposals calling for some sort of control, including the possibility of a single international corporation as a World Airline, with every nation participating. These suggestions were all unacceptable to the United States.chicago-conference-photo4

What was emerging during the convention was that the nations in attendance were there to strengthen their weaknesses. Indeed, the U.S. was present to secure landing rights in foreign countries and that was the goal in calling for the convention in the first place. The U.S. did not bring up issues such as frequencies, traffic or capacity. As the convention progressed, however, it was clear that the U.S. would have to back down from its laissez-faire position. This occurred when the Canadian delegation proposed the “Four Freedoms of the Air” that would be universally acceptable:

First Freedom

The right to fly and carry traffic over the territory of another partner to the agreement without landing.

Second Freedom

The right to land in those countries for technical reasons such as refueling without boarding or deplaning passengers.

Third Freedom

The right of an airline from one country to land in a different country and deplane passengers coming from the airline’s own country.

Fourth Freedom

The right of an airline from one country to land in a different country and board passengers traveling to the airline’s own country.

For the United States, these did not meet its requirements for control on international trunk routes. Accordingly, the U.S. added a “Fifth Freedom” to the Canadian proposal.

Fifth Freedom

The right of an airline from one country to land in a second country, to then pick up passengers and fly on to a third country where the passengers then deplane.

This proposal was not received well by the other major nations as it made quite clear the U.S. objectives: to dominate and monopolize much of the world’s traffic. As a result, because the U.S. was unable to get sufficient support from the delegates for the Fifth Freedom rights, at the close of the convention, the economic issues such as fares, frequencies and capacities were left unresolved.

The failure to resolve the economic issues left the question as to where an airline could fly dependent on bilateral negotiations. And in these negotiations, the parties would summon whatever power they had to secure the greatest contribution to their national well-being. The convention amplified the importance of bilateral negotiations. The reality was that no strength in technical matters, no amount of operating know-how or superiority in quality can overcome the inability to reach a market. The British may not have been technically superior to the United States, but they did have control of one end of a large number of international journeys. This was sufficient to negate much of the U.S. superiority, and the failure of the British to sign-off on the Fifth Freedom addition was considered the major reason for the inability of the U.S. to secure those rights.

One notable absentee at Chicago was the Soviet Union. While invited and actually prepared to attend, a last minute decision was made not to attend. Considerable speculation arose as to why. One reason suggested was a low priority given to international civil aviation. Other reasons, however, were more feasible: First, attendance might have forced the Soviets to grant the right of innocent flyover its territorial air space. This would have been difficult to refuse since the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences lay ahead. Another was that the Soviets might have been forced into a premature disclosure of its plans for Eastern Europe.

The convention ended however, with three important accomplishments:

Established the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)

Produced the Freedoms of the Air.

Produced the criteria for Bilateral Agreements (Air Services Agreements – ASAs)

The Convention on International Civil Aviation was signed at Chicago on 7 December 1944.

photo_21

Chicago_Convention_Titelseite

Chicago_Convention_signator

Key Provisions:

Every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory.

The aircraft of states, other than scheduled international air services, have the right to make flights across state’s territories and to make stops without obtaining prior permission. However, the state may require the aircraft to make a landing.

No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State.

Each state shall keep its own rules of the air as uniform as possible with those established under the convention, the duty to ensure compliance with these rules rests with the contracting state.

Before an international flight, the pilot in command must ensure that the aircraft is airworthy, duly registered and that the relevant certificates are on board the aircraft. The required documents are:

Certificate of Registration

Certificate of Airworthiness

Passenger names, place of boarding and destination

Crew licenses

Journey Logbook

Radio License

Cargo manifest

The aircraft of a state flying in or over the territory of another state shall only carry radios licensed and used in accordance with the regulations of the state in which the aircraft is registered. The radios may only be used by members of the flight crew suitably licensed by the state in which the aircraft is registered.

The pilot and crew of every aircraft engaged in international aviation must have certificates of competency and licenses issued or validated by the state in which the aircraft is registered.

Recognition of Certificates and Licenses. Certificates of Airworthiness, certificates of competency and licenses issued or validated by the state in which the aircraft is registered, shall be recognized as valid by other states. The requirements for issue of those Certificates or Airworthiness, certificates of competency or licenses must be equal to or above the minimum standards established by the Convention.

No aircraft or personnel with endorsed licenses or certificate will engage in international navigation except with the permission of the state or states whose territory is entered. Any license holder who does not satisfy international standard relating to that license or certificate shall have attached to or endorsed on that license information regarding the particulars in which he does not satisfy those standards.

The Convention is now supported by nineteen annexes containing standards and recommended practices (SARPs). The annexes are amended regularly by ICAO and are as follows:

Annex 1 – Personnel Licensing

Annex 2 – Rules of the Air

Annex 3 – Meteorological Service for International Air Navigation

Annex 4 – Aeronautical Charts

Annex 5 – Units of Measurement to be used in Air and Ground Operations

Annex 6 – Operation of Aircraft

Annex 7 – Aircraft Nationality and Registration Marks

Annex 8 – Airworthiness of Aircraft

Annex 9 – Facilitation

Annex 10 – Aeronautical Telecommunications

Annex 11 – Air Traffic Services – Air Traffic Control Service, Flight Information Service and Alerting Service

Annex 12 – Search and Rescue

Annex 13 – Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation

Annex 14 – Aerodromes

Annex 15 – Aeronautical Information Services

Annex 16 – Environmental Protection

Annex 17 – Security: Safeguarding International Civil Aviation against Acts of Unlawful Interference

Annex 18 – The Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air

Annex 19 – Safety Management (Since 14 November 2013)

Units of Measurement to be used in air and ground operations: feet (for vertical distance/altitude), knots (for speed), and nautical miles (for distance).

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) was formed to administer the Convention.

icao

ICAO

Key areas of interest:

Establishment of international technical standards and recommended practices in the conduct of international air operations

Standardization of procedures

Air navigation

Communications and air traffic management

Air safety

Development in aircraft design

Growth and development of airways and airports

Cooperation between member nations

Sets industry technical and legal standards for member states’ civil aviation authorities

ICAO_World_Headquarters

Objectives:

Insure the safe and orderly growth of international civil aviation throughout the world

Encourage the arts of aircraft design and operation for peaceful purpose

Encourage the development of airways, airports and air navigation facilities for international civil aviation

Meet the needs of the peoples of the world for safe, regular, efficient and economical air transport

Prevent economic waste caused by unreasonable competition

Insure that the rights of contracting States are fully respected and that every contracting State has a fair opportunity to operate international airlines

Avoid discrimination between contracting States

Promote safety of flight in international air navigation

Promote generally the development of all aspects of international civil aeronautics

IMAGE635054387029267534

Freedoms of the Air

airfreedom3ry

First Freedom

The right to fly and carry traffic over the territory of another partner to the agreement without landing

Second Freedom

The right to land in those countries for technical reasons such as refueling without boarding or deplaning passengers

Third Freedom

The right of an airline from one country to land in a different country and deplane passengers coming from the airline’s own country

Fourth Freedom

The right of an airline from one country to land in a different country and board passengers traveling to the airline’s own country

Fifth Freedom

The right of an airline from one country to land in a second country, to then pick up passengers and fly on to a third country where the passengers then deplane

Sixth Freedom

The right to carry traffic from one country through the home country of the airline to a third country

Seventh Freedom

The right to carry traffic from one country to another country without going through the home country of the airline

Eighth Freedom

The right to carry passengers between two or more points in one foreign country with continuing service to or from one’s own country, known as “True Cabotage”

Ninth Freedom

The ninth freedom is a variation from the Eighth Freedom in that it is the right to carry passengers within a foreign country without continuing service to or from one’s own country, known as “Stand-alone Cabotage” and almost no country permits it

Bilateral Agreements

The criteria produced by the Chicago Convention included the following key provisions:

Exchange of air rights

Equality of treatment with respect to airport charges, customs duties and inspection fees

Mutual recognition of airworthiness certificates and personnel

Compliance with laws pertaining to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, etc

Regulations concerning ownership and control

The designated carrier/s (“Chosen Instrument”?), the routes served and tariffs

The International Air Transport Association

Shortly after the Chicago Convention, a call was made for a meeting among airline operators with a proposal to form a non-governmental organization of airline operators. During this meeting, articles of association were drafted for consideration at a conference to be held in Havana in April 1945. On 19 April, the articles were approved and enacted, forming the International Air Transport Association (IATA).

iata    IATA-2

Focused on economic rather than technical issues, the purpose of IATA initially was to to promote safe, regular and economical air transport for the benefit of the peoples of the world; to foster air commerce and to study the problems connected therewith; to provide the means of collaboration among the air transport enterprises engaged directly or indirectly in international air transport services; and to cooperate with ICAO”. Today these functions largely remain the same:

Sets economic standards for the orderly flow of air transportation throughout the world

Coordinates fares and rates among member airlines

Provides forum for industry agreements between airlines (interline, alliances)

Conducts training for airline personnel

Provides clearing house for collections on interline international tickets

Holds semiannual “Slot Conference”

Assigns airline designators

The Bermuda Agreement of 1946

The Bermuda Conference was held in 1946 and it was essentially a conference between the two airline powers, Britain and the United States. There was a feeling of urgency at the conference. Besides the aviation issues to be resolved, Britain was in a severe crisis over its balance of payments and was concurrently negotiating a $3.75 billion loan on easy terms. At the same time, the U.S. was engaged in conference with Britain and its commonwealth partners over telecommunications rights with the hope that empire preferences disciminatory to the U.S. would be eliminated. It was, however, the principle aim of the conference to reconcile the widely divergent views held by the two nations on the extent to which international air transport should be controlled.

The Bermuda Air Agreement, known as the Bermuda Agreement of 1946, was accepted by both nations. Its provisions included criteria regarding Fifth Freedom Rights, including consideration of the traffic requirements between the country of origin and the country of destination, the requirements of through airline operation and the traffic requirements of the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.

The key provisions included:

Provided for Fifth Freedom rights with reciprocity

Provided for extensive routes between the two countries with the requirement for reciprocity

No arbitrary restrictions on capacity or flight frequencies

Procedures for rate-making and traffic rules assigned to IATA subject to government approval

Disputes referred to the ICAO for advisory opinion

Pan American and BOAC were the designated carriers

Became model for future bilateral agreements

This agreement enabled Pan American pick up passengers at London for passage to points east. As the agreement also applied to commonwealth countries, Pan American benefited from Fifth Freedom rights at points in India and later at Hong Kong. This enabled Pan American to launch its round-the-world services in 1947.

Below are pages from a 1948 Pan American time table showing its round-the-world service and the scene in New York at the departure of its first round-the-world flight.The the area through which the airline passes after taking account of local and regional services.n and the traffic requirements.

1948 Jun   1948 RTW straight

First RTW flight leaving LGA 061747 PAHF-1

The “Chosen Instrument”

The concept of the “Chosen Instrument” suggests that the national carriers designated to operate international routes by their owning nations are instruments of those nations’ foreign policy.  Indeed, through the bilateral agreement system promulgated by the Chicago Convention, that could ring true. However, the term preceded Chicago.

During the early years of Pan American’s growth, the U.S. government looked very favorably at the carrier, and viewed it as an “instrument” of foreign policy by using the airline to facilitate economic expansion to Latin America and the Caribbean. The U.S. government, in fact, awarded Pan American every foreign airmail route for which bids were invited. This was helped by provisions of the Foreign Air Mail Act that provided that only airlines capable of operating on a scale and manner that would project the dignity of the United States in Latin America would be granted the right to carry international mail. Secondly, contracts would only be given to companies that had been invited for operations by the host countries. In both cases, Juan Trippe made sure that Pan American had no competition. He aggressively pursued friendly relations with most countries in Latin America and the Caribbean and often personally met with foreign leaders. Trippe was also the kind of entrepreneur who emphasized elegance and grandeur in operating his airline. To enhance the stature of Pan American, Trippe also invited the famous aviator Charles Lindbergh to serve as a technical adviser.

In addition, there was concern over the German presence in South America in the 1930s. The German airline Lufthansa had established subsidiaries in various countries and Sociedad Colombo-Alemana de Transportes Aéreos (SCADTA) was formed by a group of Colombian and German businessmen, posing a threat to the Panama Canal. This meant the presence of German propaganda and espionage. Pan American proceeded to acquire SCADTA and other German subsidiaries to remove the German presence and expand its Latin American route network. In essence, this was carrying out U.S. foreign policy to rid the continent of the German presence.

Up to World War II, because of its leadership and role in international commercial aviation, Pan American was considered the “Chosen Instrument” for the United States.

However, while Trippe was largely successful negotiating on behalf of his airline and his government, his stature as the “ad hoc” transport minister would soon come to an end following his efforts to secure transatlantic authority from the British and the U.S. government’s eventual policy of government-to-government negotiations for foreign landing rights. However, although Pan American no longer had a monopoly on international routes, the airline was still considered the principle international carrier, and indeed, the “Chosen Instrument”.

The “Chosen Instrument” survived up through the Cold War largely because of the restrictive nature of the regulated airline industry and the resultant barriers to entry. With the advent of “Open Skies” and general liberalization of the industry, this concept has faded away. Under the current regime, there is virtually no airline that can really claim to be an instrument of its country’s foreign policy.

END OF PART THREE

The next installment of this story, Part 4, will cover the post-War regulated and protectionist era of the airline industry including the government role in international commercial aviation during the Cold War.

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Pan Am Series – Part XLII: Flying to the USSR – 2

Москва – часть вторая

In the previous posting, the story of how Pan American World Airways began operations to the Soviet Union were detailed from the early negotiations to the first flight on 15 July 1968. For the next ten years, Pan American operated at least a weekly flight between New York and Moscow using Boeing 707 equipment. In 1978, the service was suspended largely due to commercial reasons.

Initially, Pan American’s Moscow service was operated by flight 44 eastbound and flight 45 westbound, with Boeing 707 equipment. In the September 1969 timetable, the service was twice a week, flight 44 operating on Mondays and Fridays, and the return flight 45 on Tuesdays and Saturdays. The route included a stop in Copenhagen, although no local traffic was permitted between that city and Moscow. This service is illustrated below:

1969 - Sep -cover   1969 - Sep -0001   1969 - Sep -0002

By October, 1971, the service was changed to flights 102 (eastbound) and 103 (westbound), with a stopover in London. This was a once a week rotation, with the eastbound flight departing New York on Friday and the westbound from Moscow on Sunday. No local traffic was permitted between London and Moscow. The flights were operated with Boeing 707 equipment.

1971 - Oct cover   1971 - Oct

This service continued through October 1973, although the timetable did not indicate any restrictions on local traffic between London and Moscow.

1973 - Oct cover   1973 - Oct

By 1975, the original flights 44/45 returned to the schedule, with a once weekly service between New York and Moscow, eastbound on Saturday and westbound on Sunday with Boeing 707 equipment. The stopover in Copenhagen was re-instated and there was no indication that there were restrictions on local traffic in the December 1975 timetable. Flights 44/45 also made a New York-Copenhagen-Warsaw rotation on Sundays and Thursdays, returning on  Mondays and Fridays with Boeing 707 equipment.

1975 - Dec cover   1975 - Dec

By August 1978, the last year of operations between New York and Moscow, the service was operated by flight 66 eastbound and flight 67 westbound, using Boeing 747 equipment between New York and Frankfurt and Boeing 727 equipment between Frankfurt and Moscow. The rotation operated twice a week, Mondays and Fridays eastbound and Wednesdays and Sundays westbound. There appeared to be no restrictions on local traffic between Frankfurt and Moscow.

During this ten year period, the US and the USSR. signed an agreement on joint cooperation in the field of transportation calling for exchanges of information in areas that included the safety and efficiency of civil aviation. As a result of the pact, FAA officials and their Soviet counterparts held meetings on a variety of technical subjects. The agreement was one of a series signed by officials during a summit meeting between President Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. The last of these agreements, signed on 23 June 1973, provided for an expansion of direct airline flights between the two countries. Previously, Pan American and Aeroflot had each been allowed two round-trip flights per week between New York and Moscow. The two airlines were now permitted up to three flights per week, and Pan Am received authorization to land at Leningrad, and Aeroflot at Washington. The new authority was never inaugurated on a scheduled basis.

In 1978, Pan American discontinued operations in the USSR as part of a cutback on its European flights. The load factors were low and this was largely attributed to its inability to gain market share. Quite simply, Soviet citizens could not buy Pan Am tickets. In order to obtain their papers to travel abroad, Soviet citizens were required to hold Aeroflot tickets. In addition, Aeroflot would undersell Western airlines to earn hard currency.

After Pan American discontinued operations, Aeroflot continued its Moscow-New York service. However, under President Carter, Aeroflot service was reduced to two flights per week, effective January 13, 1980, as part of a response to Soviet military actions in Afghanistan.

George Hambleton was closely involved in the inauguration of Pan American’s service to Moscow. In the previous posting, he related is experiences related to the first flight. He also spent time on the ground in Moscow involved with the protocol on the commercial side of the operation. Below are his recollections, taken from his story in the book  Pan American World Airways – Aviation History Through the Words of its People:

“The first New York-Moscow flights made one stop on the way – Montreal for Aeroflot and Copenhagen for Pan Am.  Shortly before Pan Am’s first scheduled flight, another Pan American 707 “protocol” flight, with Government officials and VIP guests took off.  I remember suggesting to New York that the person with the most impact possible to be invited as an inaugural guest would be Jacqueline Onassis.  Secretly, the Russians loved John F. Kennedy.  He had stood up to Khrushchev and made him back down!  Jackie Onassis would have been a sensation.

 “Pan Am’s initial weekly flights were 10 hours 50 minutes eastbound – 11 hours 45 minutes westbound.  First class fares were $584 one way, and $1,109 round trip.  Economy fares were $384 one way off season — $429 during the summer peak.

 “Aeroflot’s inaugural ‘protocol’ flight was led by the Deputy Minister of Civil Aviation.  The Russians had taken our inaugural guests to the Bolshoi in Moscow, so we felt obligated to reciprocate.  Finding forty seats to the ballet in New York was not easy.  We arranged for dinner at a very nice restaurant near the Lincoln Center.  The restaurant had made a major effort to look old fashioned – bare brick walls, with gas lights protruding from the walls.  When the Russian Deputy Minister saw the gas lights, he said, ‘In Moscow we have electricity!’

 “Pan Am’s operation, very efficiently led by Airport Manager, Walter Nelson, at Sheremetyevo, had a much greater impact than its relatively low initial schedules would have indicated.  An analysis of the flights to Moscow by themselves could show a money losing “National Interest” route, but if incremental trans-Atlantic traffic, connecting over other gateways, was added, the Moscow operation was quite successful.  Most connecting passengers would not have called Pan Am if we had not been serving Moscow.

 “In spite of constant ‘stealing’ of our passengers by rank and file Aeroflot employees, we managed to generate more Moscow originating trans-Atlantic traffic than other western airlines.  Aeroflot would not help pending passengers until the long exit and entry visa processes were completed.  The wife of the US Consul came to work for Pan Am, giving us access to visa applications.  We were able to help Russian passengers early in the visa process.  Many of them had prepaid tickets, paid for by relatives in the U.S.

“All tickets had to be issued by Aeroflot’s Moscow reservations office.  It was called the Central International Agency – until I pointed out that was ‘CIA’  They changed the name!

* * *

“No advertising signs were permitted on the outside of buildings in Moscow in those days.  Our corner office on the second floor of the turn of the century Metropol Hotel had two huge bay windows.  We ordered two large signs (white squares, with huge Pan Am blue balls, some seven or eight feet across), and mounted them on the inside of the large bay windows, directly across a square from the Bolshoi Ballet, in the center of Moscow.  With no other advertising signs, and, particularly, no other American signs, in the center of the city, this caused quite a stir. 

“Moscow city officials were bemused, but chagrined.  We were not advertising on the outside of the building in violation of their regulations, and they empathized with this ‘manipulation of the system.’  ‘We see what you’re doing!’ Moscow bureaucrats did not know much about New York.  We assured them, if they let us keep our signs, we’d make sure that Vladimir Samaroukov, Aeroflot’s manager in New York, would be permitted to put up Aeroflot signs there!  We waited a month or so before turning on the lighted Pan Am signs.  By then it was clear to all that an American Company was firmly ensconced in the heart of Moscow – unheard of until that time.  To help cement the arrangement, we may have asked the bureaucrats to help us distribute a few boxes of Pan Am calendars.

***

“As a symbol of confidence, Pan Am had a custom of bringing the entire Board of Directors, with the wives or husbands, on the same airplane for board meetings at different locations around the world.  The Board decided to come to Moscow.  Preparations were exhaustive.  We even had my good wife, Janet, do a survey of ladies’ rooms in areas we planned to take the Board.  Intourist was helpful, but, as the Russians say, the reason Napoleon failed in Russia was because his plans were made by Intourist!

“We arranged a private meeting between Minister Loginov and Juan Trippe.  I was privileged to attend.  Although nothing had yet leaked to the press, Mr. Trippe confided to Marshal Loginov that Pan Am had decided not to go forward with supersonic operations, but, instead, to develop widebody aircraft.  Loginov was stunned.  Aeroflot and the Russians had clearly put all their emphasis into developing their version of the supersonic Concorde.  Suddenly, they feared being left behind by the airlines of the world following Pan Am with wide-bodies.

“In spite of continuing tight controls of the Breshnev era – small cracks in the Kremlin walls – (hardly noticeable at the time) – were beginning to appear.  Alya Andersen, wife of New York Times bureau chief, Ray Andersen, worked in the Pan Am office.  She said quietly one day that her father, who lived in Ryazan, a closed area south of Moscow, had devoted his life to this great cause, communism, which he thought was the answer to everything.  In his late forties, he began to realize it was not working – it was all a big mistake.  Alya said he was totally frustrated – he was afraid to discuss it with anybody – but felt he had wasted his life.  There must have been millions of others like him, waiting for glasnost and perestroika, which did not come until Gorbachov, a couple of decades later.”

A Young George Hambleton at Moscow with a Pan American 707

A young George Hambleton at Moscow with a Pan American 707

Once the flights were started, there was a requirement for Russian-speaking flight attendants (then, stewardesses). Ilona Duncan, a flight attendant from that era, was one who was sent to Moscow for a four week course in Russian. Not only did she learn Russian, but also about the Soviet society at the time. Her story also appears in the book Pan American World Airways – Aviation History Through the Words of its People, excerpted below:

“The afternoon of January 12, 1971, as the Pan Am Clipper flight 44 makes its final approach to Moscow’s Sheremetyevo Airport, I glance down at snow-covered fields framed by dark lifeless bushes and trees.  Here and there I can make out a house forlorn in the vast wintry Russian landscape exuding the melancholic mood of the Russian soul so often described in the works of Tolstoy and Pushkin.  Tired from an all-night flight starting in New York via Copenhagen, a sense of excitement drives away my feeling of drowsiness.  I am one of 31 Pan American stewardesses, who signed up for a Russian language course in Moscow.  To alleviate the shortage of Russian speaking cabin personnel since Pan Am started operating flights to the Soviet Union in 1968, Pan American arranged this 4-week program at minimal cost of hotel and meal expenses to us, while we agreed to an unpaid leave-of-absence.  Within our group of eleven nationalities, (French, German, Swedish, Norwegian, Israeli, Yugoslavian, Argentinean, Honduran, Uruguayan, Dutch and American,) I am one of the few with a background of studying Russian at Hunter College, in the hope of eventually adding it to the other four languages (French, Italian, Dutch and German) I am qualified to speak on board.  Federal Air Regulations required at least one person to be able to communicate in the language spoken at the destination country of every flight.

“We arrive at the Hotel National in time for dinner, served from 6:30-7:30 p.m.  A babushka (grandmother) who occupies a desk on every floor hands me the room key and, as we observe from then on, notes down every one of our movements, an outcome of the ongoing Cold War.  My room, which I share with my Swedish friend, consists of two single beds separated by a table.  Heavy curtains hide the view from the window.  A single light bulb dangles from the high ceiling and gives off enough light to reveal the cracks in the lime green walls.  When I go to take a long bath, I discover no stop in the tub, and a shower head is non-existent.

* * * 

“Our daily schedule allows for little idle time, starting with breakfast between 9 and 9:45, lessons at the department for foreign students at Moscow State University from 10 to 1, followed by lunch from 1:30-2:30, and excursions on most afternoons.  Bus transportation is provided by Moscow’s Intourist Office.  Every second day drivers are exchanged for fear we might become too friendly with them.

“We attend a fashion show where we get an authentic taste of life in the Soviet Union, where Russian models present lackluster and unappealing outfits.  We visit Moscow’s Wedding Palace to witness a line-up of grooms in dark suits and brides in frilly white dresses ready to take their vows.  We sleep in bunk beds on a night train for a weekend in Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) and wonder what is so important to hide from our view, that the windows had been boarded shut.  

* * *

“Although interchange with Russians is strongly discouraged, we attract the curiosity of young people.  Among the drab colors worn by everyone in Moscow we stand out in our fashionable attire .

* * * 

“Others want to practice their foreign languages with us. After meeting students at a café, I suggest: ‘Why don’t we all go to my hotel and sit in the lobby?’

“The minute we climb the stairs to the main hall, two men emerge, grab the young students by their arms, shouting in Russian: ‘Rusky nyet’ (No Russians).

“’All we want to do is talk,’ I plead.

“’No Russians allowed in this hotel.’

“One afternoon, my roommate and I walk up to the roof-top terrace on the 23rd floor of the Russia Hotel for a postcard view of Saint Basil‘s Cathedral and Red Square.  Raising my camera for a photo, a male voice screams from behind: ‘Stop, or you will be arrested.’  In a frenzy we make a run for a lady’s room where I quickly remove the film before a uniformed man enters. Terrified we endure a tirade of reprimands. Finding my camera empty he lets us go.  I had forgotten that we are never to take photos from high places. 

* * *

“Despite some anxious moments, the highlights of our stay are the cultural events. Every evening we occupy the best seats at one of the theaters or concert halls. During intermission at the Bolshoi or Kremlin Theatre we savor dishes of mushrooms in cream sauce or ice-cream topped with loganberries.  Never again will I see a performance rising to the level of perfection and beauty as at the Bolshoi Theater. 

“On our last day of school we receive a certificate of attendance.  Our teacher has tried her utmost to drill some basic Russian into our brains. But without prior knowledge most of the students have trouble understanding her and reading the alphabet.  Back in New York, a few months later, I become qualified as Russian speaker on Pan Am flights thrilled to return to Moscow.”

16B-IlonaatAeroflotFlightAcademy-1   16B-IlonaatAeroflotFlightAcademy-2

Ilona Duncan at the Aeroflot Flight Academy

In the next posting, Pan American re-instates its Moscow service in 1986 and introduces a 747 nonstop rotation in 1988.

For additional information about Pan American World Airways:

The Book Pan American World Airways – Aviation history Through the Words of its People contains 71 stories written by the people of Pan Am who played important roles in many of the important events in Pan Am’s history. The book is published by BlueWaterPress.

Preview Pan American World Airways – Aviation History Through the Words of its People

For purchasing information, visit the publisher, BlueWaterPress or Amazon

Also available in a Kindle Edition

For a companion book with a timeline of Pan Am history and images of aircraft, timetables and other memorabilia, see a preview of  Pan American World Airways – Images of a Great Airline

The book is also available directly from the publisher, BlueWaterPress or Amazon.

For further information about the history of Pan American World Airways, visit: Pan Am Historical Foundation

 

Pan Am Series – Part XLI: Flying to the USSR – 1

Москва

One of the major accomplishments of Pan American World Airways was its involvement in opening an airline route between the United States and the then Soviet Union (USSR). Of all the routes operated by Pan American, this would probably be the one route on which the airline actually operated as the “Chosen Instrument” or indeed as an instrument of American foreign policy.

The first flight from New York to Moscow was 15 July 1968. However it took years to finalize the arrangements that led to the inauguration of regular airline service between the two Cold War rivals. During this time, relations between the United States and the Soviet Union ranged from friendly to confrontational and included numerous events that were major news makers during that era.

USA and USSR Flag

The first instance of Pan American interest in entering into an airline service agreement occurred during the 1930s when Juan Trippe held discussions with the Russians. These discussions, however, were thwarted by politics. In 1945, the US Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) awarded American Export (AOA) authority to serve Moscow by extension from Helsinki. Pan American inherited this authority from the AOA merger, but the authority lay dormant due to the Cold War.

About ten years later, during the Geneva Summit in 1955, US President Eisenhower proposed an exchange of airline service agreement with USSR. That year, the USSR concluded bilateral treaty with Finland, its first.

Bob Henriques 1959 magnumphotos.com

President Eisenhower (left) and Soviet Premier Khrushchev (right) in 1959

In 1956, the USSR concluded bilateral treaties with the Scandinavian countries for routes to Copenhagen with “beyond” (Fifth Freedom) rights to London, Brussels, Paris and Amsterdam. In addition, the Soviet Embassy in Washington, DC approached Juan Trippe and Pan American about opening a route between the US and the USSR. Trippe reported the contact to the U.S. State Department and the CAB and was authorized to continue discussions (in effect to revert to his old-style diplomacy), even though the opening of the route would be subject to a bilateral agreement between the USA and the USSR.

Based on this authority, Trippe went to Washington and met with Yevgeny F. Loginov, Minister of Civil Aviation and director of Aeroflot. Talks focused at the start on technical matters such as maintenance facilities, radio navigation, fuel storage and baggage handling. Negotiations were protracted.  During this time, Trippe also visited Moscow.

By 1958, both nations had agreed to exchange airline service and the US-USSR cultural exchange agreement of 1958-59 contained promises that an air pact would be signed in due course. During that time, Khrushchev accused the U.S. ambassador to the USSR of “foot-dragging” in the negotiations.

In 1959 Trippe accompanied US Vice President Nixon to to Moscow and met with his Aeroflot counterpart. The Aeroflot chief later accompanied Khrushchev to the US and suggested the US attempt to persuade the Scandinavian countries to give the Soviets overflight (First Freedom) rights on its route to New York. This suggestion however, was in conflict with NATO policy of “confining” Soviet international aviation and insisting on strict reciprocity. These talks, however, were postponed to a more suitable time due to the U-2 incident, the abortive Paris summit meeting and the shooting down of a USAF RB-47.

US_Air_Force_U-2_(2139646280)    Khrushchev_U2

U-2 aircraft (left); Khrushchev looking at wreckage (right)

 Things eased when President Kennedy was sworn in as President and talks resumed. However, the FAA Administrator warned Secretary of State Dean Rusk that a standard bilateral agreement (modeled on Bermuda) should not be used with Russia, otherwise Pan American would be at a disadvantage compared with Aeroflot. Both countries, however, finally agreed on text, and Pan American and Aeroflot agreed on inter-carrier matters.

Unfortunately, however, the Soviets’ building of the Berlin Wall and the Cuban Missile Crisis intervened, causing President Kennedy to decline to sign the air agreement.

Berlin_Wall_1961-11-20     640px-Kennedy_in_Berlin

Building the Berlin Wall (1961)(left); President Kennedy at the Berlin Wall (1961)(right)

american-and-russian-military-  Bettmann CORBIS

Cuban Missile Crisis (Credit: Bettmann/Corbis)

In 1963, President Kennedy advised Soviet Premier Gromyko that the US is ready to move forward on the airline agreement. There were still issues to be resolved, however, and it was not until December, 1963 that President Johnson, who succeeded the late President Kennedy, instructed Najeeb Halaby (then FAA head, later president of Pan American) to solve the remaining problems with the Soviets regarding the treaty. However, there was opposition to the treaty in the US, with the fear that the treaty will allow Soviet penetration into the Western hemisphere. In addition, the Vietnam War soured relations.

By 1966, USSR and Canada had concluded a bilateral air agreement giving Aeroflot authority to Montreal. President Johnson also suggested that the old agreement should be looked at again, and on 4 November 1966, the US-USSR agreement was signed in Washington.

The agreement differed from typical bilateral agreements where agreement on the commercial aspects of air services between the two countries, including capacity and tariffs, were made subject to a prior agreement between the designated airlines (Pan American and Aeroflot) which, in turn, was subject to prior governmental approval.

According to Marilyn Bender and Selig Altschul in Chosen Instrument, the agreement was a money loser. It entailed a once a week round-trip for each airline and the Russians prohibited Pan American from drumming up business in the USSR. “Although it may have been in the national interest for an American-flag carrier to fly to Moscow, there was no subsidy forthcoming from Washington.”

In 1967, another barrier was encountered when it was discovered that Soviet aircraft did not meet noise limitations, had insufficient avionics and flew too fast for US holding patterns. Rumors were that that the Soviets did not want to share technical data because of the similarity between their commercial aircraft and their bombers.

Later, the Soviet-Canadian agreement was amended  to give Aeroflot beyond rights to New York. A new Soviet plane, the IL-62 began making test trips to New York and other U S airports.

On 15 July 15 1968, Aeroflot’s inaugural flight arrived at New York’s Kennedy Airport; on the same day a Pan Am 707 took off for Moscow on its inaugural flight to the Soviet Union.

First Regular Moscow-New York Flight     Boarding

PAA 707 off to Moscow

PAA 707 off to Moscow-2     PAA 707 arrive Moscow

PAN_707 arriving Moscow 16 July 1968 - 1     KONICA MINOLTA DIGITAL CAMERA

Aeroflot IL-62 preparing for departure in Moscow (top)

Pan American 707 departing New York for Moscow (middle)

Pan American 707 arrival at Moscow (bottom)

All photos from http://www.miniaviamodel.ru

George Hambleton was sent by Juan Trippe to Moscow to develop good relations with Marshal Loginov, the Minister of Civil Aviation and director of Aeroflot. He wrote about this assignment in the book Pan American World Airways – Aviation History Through the Words of its People.  Excerpts from his story are below:

“Juan Trippe had sent me to Moscow from Helsinki in the mid 1960’s to develop good relations with Marshal Loginov, Minister of Civil Aviation, in an effort to persuade Aeroflot to join Pan Am in developing an InterContinental Hotel in Russia.  The contracts had been signed in Helsinki.  Mr. Trippe told me not to tell anyone about the Russian hotel proposal – not even my own boss in Pan Am.  Relations with the Ministry and Aeroflot developed favorably, but a hotel agreement was never concluded.  The favorable relations, however, set the stage for eventual introduction of scheduled services between New York and Moscow.

“During the early negotiations, I remember, with some amusement, our US technical team telling Aeroflot that the FAA required both DME and transponders on all aircraft entering New York airspace.  This was long before GPS.  The Pan Am team said with these two instruments pilots could know their exact location.  The answer from Aeroflot was, “Soviet pilots always know their exact location!”   However, if one had looked closely at the belly antenna of the Russian IL-62, after service began, one would have seen the insignia, ‘RCA’ (Radio Corporation of America).

“In the Cold War decade of the 1960’s, after Sputnick, the Cuban missile confrontation, and the Kennedy assassination, life in Moscow was grim.  The city was bleak, drab and grey.  There was no lighting or advertising signs on the sides of buildings – no color printing – only some faded reds and blue.  The terror of the years of Stalinist purges had diminished but fear was still pervasive – particularly among older people.  The attitude of many was, ‘We have always been at war – with the Germans – before that with the French – the Swedes – and the Tartars.  Our memories are all of sadness.’ * * *

“Into this world I walked as a relatively young man, with a young English wife, two young children, and a Labrador puppy.  How to cope with this system, and have an efficient Pan Am operation off to a successful start was the question.  Given Pan Am’s strict worldwide policy against bribes and corruption, it seemed almost impossible, until we remembered a clause in the bilateral air agreement.  Aeroflot was permitted to distribute advertising material in the United States – and Pan Am was permitted to distribute advertising material in the Soviet Union.

“Here was our incredible secret weapon.  There was nothing in Russia like the Pan Am calendar, with its large, beautiful color pictures of worldwide destinations.  People who had no other color pictures would frame them to hang in their otherwise drab and crowded apartments.  I was told that Pan Am calendars would sell for the equivalent of some twenty or thirty dollars on the black market.  During communist days, the Soviet Poet and playwright Vladimir Mayakovsky wrote ‘Without a piece of paper you’re an insect – with a piece of paper you’re a man!’  We had a piece of paper that made it legal for us to distribute these valuable items – a box of a hundred calendars was a pretty handsome gift – It was advertising material.

“Eventually service began. 

“On July 14, 1968 Richard Witkin wrote in the New York Times:

‘At Pan American World Airways’ second floor sales office in the Hotel Metropol, 15 sons and daughters of American Embassy officials spent much of the rainy Moscow         Sunday putting 16 kopek’s worth of stamps on 22,000 envelopes marking the inaugural        flight….  The letter will be flown to New York on the… Pan American flight, and      delivered to stamp collectors and others with special interest in the start of the route.

‘The (Pan Am/Aeroflot inaugural) flights will culminate a diplomatic effort that had its fragile beginning in the first Soviet-American cultural exchange agreement in 1958.  It also will be another in a series of recent signs that relations between the two countries are being selectively improved, despite strains imposed by the Vietnam War.’

* * *

“In the early 1960’s, Mr. Khrushchev had been saying the Soviet Union would soon “overtake and surpass” the United States.  Speaking at a ceremony celebrating Pan Am/Aeroflot service in the late ‘60’s, Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson said there was one field in which he would welcome the Soviet Union overtaking and surpassing the United States – that was in the number of visitors from Russia to the United States overtaking the number of visitors from the United States to Russia.”

1969 - Sep -cover   1969 - Sep -0001     1969 - Sep -0002

The September 1969 timetable (above) illustrates the Pan American Moscow service that was operated for ten years. In the next posting of the “Pan Am Series” will be a description of the operation during this period.

For additional information about Pan American World Airways:

The Book Pan American World Airways – Aviation history Through the Words of its People contains 71 stories written by the people of Pan Am who played important roles in many of the important events in Pan Am’s history. The book is published by BlueWaterPress.

Preview Pan American World Airways – Aviation History Through the Words of its People

For purchasing information, visit the publisher, BlueWaterPress or Amazon

Also available in a Kindle Edition

For a companion book with a timeline of Pan Am history and images of aircraft, timetables and other memorabilia, see a preview of  Pan American World Airways – Images of a Great Airline

The book is also available directly from the publisher, BlueWaterPress or Amazon.

For further information about the history of Pan American World Airways, visit: Pan Am Historical Foundation